J. DANIEL BREEN, District Judge.
On May 12, 2009, the Plaintiff, Joe B. Cooper, brought this action against the Defendant, Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District ("JMCGHD"), alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e. Before the Court is the Defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Entry ("D.E.") No. 26.) The Plaintiff responded to the motion, and the Defendant replied to the Plaintiff's response. (D.E. Nos. 34, 35.) For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
The Plaintiff was employed as a licensed clinical social worker at Pathways of Tennessee, Inc., a non-profit corporation of which JMCGHD is the sole shareholder. He was employed in that position from September 25, 2006, until he resigned on August 10, 2007. Although Cooper operated primarily out of Pathways' Dyersburg, Tennessee facility, he also worked in Pathways' Brownsville, Tennessee facility one day per week. He was the only licensed clinical social worker in Brownsville.
Prior to accepting his position with Pathways, the Plaintiff had received multiple warnings concerning Odom and the difficulties of working in the Brownsville office. (Id. at 7.) Janice Matthews, a former Pathways employee and friend of the Plaintiff, advised him that working in Brownsville "was difficult, that she felt unwanted" and "that everybody hated going." (Id. at 6.) According to the Plaintiff, Matthews told him that "[t]he whole system was set up differently" in Brownsville, including paperwork and assignment of job responsibilities. (Id.) He related that Matthews
After accepting his position, the Plaintiff claims that he received other admonitions about Odom and about working in Brownsville from the Dyersburg staff. (Id.) He acknowledges, however, that the staff's concerns about her stemmed from his professional qualifications rather than his race. (Id.) According to the Plaintiff, "[t]he thing that they felt would probably be giving me trouble was that since she wasn't qualified to be ... the director, they felt that she might see me as a threat." (Id.) As a licensed clinical social worker, Cooper had higher qualifications than Odom, and the Dyersburg staff thought she might view him as one who would vie for her position. (Id.)
During the early part of his time in Brownsville, the Plaintiff characterizes Odom's demeanor towards him as "condescending," "uncooperative," and "openly hostile." (Id. at 16, 17.) He states that upon arriving in Brownsville on his first day, she denied knowing that he would be working there and failed to give him any orientation of the office. As early as his third visit, Cooper verbally complained to Nathaniel about Odom's attitude toward him. (Id. at 17.) The Plaintiff alleges that by his third, fourth, or fifth visit, Odom had interfered with his care of patients and refused to answer questions about patients. (Id.) He claims that she would bring him her own work such as treatment plans and other forms to complete. (Id.) On one particular occasion, the Plaintiff contends that Odom "walked into [his] office when [he] had a patient, threw a chart on [his] desk, saying, `He's Medicare. I can sit on my happy ass for an hour.'" (Id.) Cooper further avers that Odom regularly spoke badly of him in front of other employees. (Id.) Perhaps most significant in this case, the Plaintiff states that Odom regularly referred to him as "whitey" or "white boy" and on one occasion told him to "get [his] white ass out of [his] fine car." (Id. at 18, 19.)
The Plaintiff noted that he spoke with Cliff Nathaniel two to three times a month about the situation with his supervisor in Brownsville. (Id. at 20.) However, Cooper did not inform Nathaniel about the severity of the racial references and because he was African-American, "race [wa]s just not an issue with [Nathaniel] at all," and he "didn't want to put [Nathaniel] in the middle of it." (Id. at 18, 20.) Although the Plaintiff made requests to stop working out of the Brownsville facility, Nathaniel informed him that he would have to continue because no other licensed social workers were available to travel there. (Id. at 19, 20-21.)
The Plaintiff maintained that his problems with Odom intensified over time. (Id. at 21.) On July 27, 2007, he filed a written complaint with Nathaniel which was forwarded to the Pathways Human Resources Department and received on August 8, 2007. (D.E. No. 34-1, at ¶ 7.) In that complaint, Cooper detailed his difficulties with Odom:
(D.E. No. 26-4.)
On August 9, 2007, Dennis Williams, a Pathways Human Resources manager, initiated an investigation into the Plaintiff's complaint. (D.E. No. 34-1, at ¶ 9.) Williams determined that "Mr. Cooper's claims of racial discrimination/harassment were investigated and were not validated. His claim of problems existing between him and Ms. Odom[ ] appear to have validity." (D.E. No. 26-2, at 6.) On August 10, 2007, before Williams' investigation was complete, the Plaintiff submitted a written resignation to Pathways. (D.E. No. 34-1, at ¶ 15.)
Cooper filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on or about February 26, 2008. (D.E. No. 26-5.) In it, the Plaintiff alleged that he "was discriminated against and subjected to racially derogatory comments because of [his] race, White, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended" and checked the box for discrimination based on "race." (Id.) The Plaintiff subsequently brought his claim against the Defendant to this Court where he more broadly asserted that "Defendant's conduct [was] discriminatory with regard to Plaintiff's race, sex and color." (D.E. No. 1 at 2.) Cooper's complaint avered that Odom "harassed [him] on an ongoing basis, created a hostile work environment, and effectuated his constructive discharge." (Id.) JMCGHD has moved for summary judgment on the basis that there are no material issues of disputed fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharm., Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1988). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). When the motion is supported by documentary proof such as depositions and affidavits, the nonmoving party may not rest on his pleadings but, rather, must present some "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. It is not sufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. These facts must be more than a scintilla of evidence and must meet the standard of whether a reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
In his EEOC charge, Cooper only checked the box for discrimination based on "race." However, his complaint alleges discrimination on the basis of "race, sex and color." (D.E. No. 1 at 3.) In the instant motion, JMCGHD argues that the Plaintiff's claims of discrimination on the basis "sex" and "color" must be dismissed for failure to submit them to the EEOC. Plaintiff does not respond to his alleged failure to charge sex discrimination with the EEOC but asserts that his claim of discrimination based on "color" should remain because "color is substantially the same as race for the purposes of this suit." (D.E. No. 34 at 1.)
"In Title VII, Congress set up an elaborate administrative procedure, implemented through the EEOC, that is designed to assist in the investigation of claims of ... discrimination in the workplace and to work towards the resolution of these claims through conciliation rather than litigation." Granderson v. Univ. of Mich., 211 Fed.Appx. 398, 400 (6th Cir. 2006); Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus., Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir.2004), reh'g & reh'g en banc denied (Aug. 5, 2004). An individual seeking to bring a Title VII discrimination claim in federal court must first exhaust her administrative remedies. Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 Fed.Appx. 466, 470-71 (6th Cir.2008); Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 379 (6th Cir.2002). However, "the requirement `is not meant to be overly rigid, nor should it result in the restriction of subsequent complaints based on procedural technicalities or the failure of the charges to contain the exact wording which might be required in a judicial pleading.'" Scott, 275 Fed.Appx. at 471 (quoting Randolph v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 732 (6th Cir.2006)). Thus, "the EEOC complaint should be liberally construed to encompass all claims reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Randolph, 453 F.3d at 732 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]here facts related with respect to the charged claim would prompt the EEOC to investigate a different, uncharged claim, the plaintiff is not precluded from bringing suit on that claim." Dixon v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 212, 217 (6th Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "[w]hen the EEOC investigation of one charge in fact reveals evidence of a different type of discrimination against the plaintiff, a lawsuit based on the newly understood claim will not be barred." Davis v. Sodexho, Cumberland Coll. Cafeteria, 157 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1998).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals requires a "broad reading of the charge because most Title VII claimants are unschooled in the technicalities of the law and proceed without counsel." Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 546 (6th Cir.1991). "[W]here the claimant is unrepresented, a `broader reading of the charge ... is compelled.'" Tisdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Duggins v. Steak `N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir.1999)). This does not mean, however, that "plaintiffs are excused from filing charges on a particular discrimination claim before suing in federal court." Johnson v. Rumsfeld, 238 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Davis, 157 F.3d at 463).
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of filing his Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC.
The Court will first address the Plaintiffs claim of sex discrimination. Although Cooper noted Odom's sex in his charge, he clearly stated that the basis of the alleged discrimination and harassment was race. He neither checked the box for discrimination based on sex, nor asserted in his explanation of the particulars of the charge that he was targeted because he was a male. Moreover, a charge of sex discrimination is not the type that would be expected to reasonably grow out of a charge of race discrimination. See, e.g., Moore v. Food Lion, No. 3:06-0712, 2007 WL 596955, at *2 (M.D.Tenn. Feb. 21, 2007) (plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination should not reasonably be expected to arise from an EEOC charge of race discrimination); Reynolds v. Solectron Global Servs., 358 F.Supp.2d 688, 692-93 (W.D.Tenn. 2005) (plaintiffs assertion of race discrimination should not reasonably be expected to grow out of EEOC charge of sex discrimination); Sain v. Am. Red Cross, 233 F.Supp.2d 923, 930-31 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (same). Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the EEOC's investigation revealed facts supporting a claim of sex discrimination. As a result, the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claim of sex discrimination. It is therefore dismissed.
Likewise, Cooper's allegation of color discrimination must be dismissed. Although "race" and "color" were not defined by Congress in Title VII, interpretive guidance issued by the EEOC makes clear that the two terms are not synonymous. See EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 15-II, III (Apr. 19, 2006). The EEOC explains:
Id. at 15-6. Previous courts have found that "color discrimination is distinct from race discrimination in that the former `arises when the particular hue of the plaintiff's skin is the cause of the discrimination, such as in the case where a darkcolored African-American individual is discriminated against in favor of a light-colored African-American individual.'" Moore, 2007 WL 596955, at *2 (quoting Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 n. 5 (4th Cir.2002)).
The thrust of Plaintiff's allegations is that he was discriminated against by an African-American director because of his Caucasian race. His allegations do not suggest that he was discriminated against because he was, for example, a fairskinned Caucasian. Thus, following the reasoning of the district court's decision in Moore v. Food Lion and the EEOC's compliance manual, Plaintiffs allegations might support a claim of race discrimination, but not one based on color. His assertion that "color is substantially the same as race for the purposes of this suit" is incorrect. Cooper has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to discrimination based on color and that claim must also be dismissed.
A discrimination claim may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence. White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 238 (6th Cir.2005). In cases such as this one, where there is a lack of direct evidence, courts review Title VII employment discrimination cases using the United States Supreme Court's well-established analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The Supreme Court has acknowledged, however, that the varying factual scenarios arising under Title VII may render portions of this standard inapplicable in some cases. Id. at 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Thus, courts have "modified [this analytical framework] to accommodate different employment discrimination contexts." Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir.1985). Courts use the McDonnell Douglas framework "to address disparate treatment cases involving all discrimination prohibited by the Act in promotion, hiring, firing, compensation or other conditions of employment." Id. In the instant case, Cooper has argued that he "was exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which other employees, who were of a different race, were not exposed" and that he was constructively discharged. He may establish an adverse employment action by proving that he was constructively discharged. Logan v. Denny's Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 568 (6th Cir.2001) ("One of the elements [of a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim] . . . is that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiff may establish an adverse employment action by demonstrating that she was constructively discharged.").
Although Plaintiff is a white male, his majority status does not preclude
Id. (citations omitted); see also Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir.2008); Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir.2002).
The Court must initially determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently shown "background circumstances [that] support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." Murray, 770 F.2d at 67. "Recent Sixth Circuit precedent suggests, in the context of reverse discrimination claims, that the mere fact that an adverse employment decision was made by a member of a racial minority is sufficient to establish the first prong of the prima facie case." Arendale, 519 F.3d at 603. In Zambetti, the plaintiff, a Caucasian police officer, alleged that the defendant, an African-American chief of police, passed him over for promotions for discriminatory reasons. 314 F.3d at 252-53. The Sixth Circuit found that the defendant's race alone was sufficient to satisfy the "background circumstances" prong of the test. Id. at 257 ("[T]he person in charge of hiring for CCC, Chief Harris, was himself African-American. This is sufficient, in our opinion, to satisfy Murray's `background circumstances' requirement."). Similarly, in Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 320 Fed.Appx. 330, 340 (6th Cir.2009), the Sixth Circuit held that a Caucasian employee established "background circumstances" simply "by showing that [his supervisor] is Hispanic and that he replaced [the employee] with an [sic] Hispanic employee."
Cooper contends that Sheila Odom's treatment toward him was so severe that he was constructively discharged and thus suffered an adverse employment action. Here, as in Zambetti and Morris, "the mere fact that an adverse employment decision was made by a member of a racial minority is sufficient to establish the first prong of the prima facie case." Arendale, 519 F.3d at 603. Thus, the fact that Sheila Odom, the Plaintiff's Brownsville supervisor, is an African-American is sufficient to satisfy Murray's "background circumstances" prong.
Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir.1994). However, plaintiff's showing does not have to be one of "exact correlation with the employee receiving more favorable treatment." Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir.1998). Courts consider whether the plaintiff and the employees with whom he compares his treatment "have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
The Defendant points to the investigation report of Dennis Williams as evidence that some African-Americans also had problems with Sheila Odom. (D.E. No. 26-3, at 3.) Williams interviewed Arnell Mann, an African-American female, who stated that she had twice been offended by Odom. She reported being told "Shut up! I'm talking!" by Odom in front of co-workers, and described Odom as "no[t] like any manager [she'd] ever had." (D.E. No. 26-2 at 10.) In contrast, other employees who Williams interviewed characterized Ms. Odom as a "good supervisor" and "one of the best." (Id.) Williams' report reveals conflict with Odom among both African-American and Caucasian employees and casts doubt on the Plaintiff's claim that he was exposed to disadvantageous terms and conditions of employment that employees of other races were not.
Furthermore, the Court notes that several differences exist in the Plaintiff's employment status compared to other employees. Other employees were stationed in the Brownsville office full time, while the Plaintiff only worked in Brownsville one day per week. The Plaintiff was in his first year as an employee at Pathways. He was also the only person in the Brownsville office qualified to treat patients with some insurance carriers. Similarly, the Plaintiff was the most highlyeducated employee working in Brownsville, even more so than Director Odom.
Most importantly, Cooper has not attempted to present evidence establishing that similarly-situated African-American employees received better treatment than he did. Although Plaintiff generally alleges that he "was exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which employees, who were of a different race, were not exposed," he fails to point to any specific African-American employees who were similarly-situated and received better treatment. Without a more specific showing, the Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Fuelling v. New Vision Med. Lab., LLC, 284 Fed.Appx. 247, 255 (6th Cir.2008) (ruling that plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of fact for trial where she "identified only one black employee
Cooper also argues that Odom's discriminatory harassment created a hostile work environment. Title VII is violated "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)).
Newman v. Fed. Express Corp., 266 F.3d 401, 405 (6th Cir.2001). In reverse discrimination cases such as this where the plaintiff is the member of a majority group, the plaintiff need not show that he is member of a protected class but rather "prove `background circumstances [to] support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.'" Arendale, 519 F.3d at 604-05 (quoting Sutherland v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir.2003)). As noted in the previous section, Cooper has proven sufficient background circumstances.
A hostile work environment "must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). In determining whether alleged harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level of a "hostile work environment," the Court must look at the "totality of the circumstances." Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367). Pursuant to this test, "the issue is not whether each incident of harassment standing alone is sufficient to sustain the cause of action in a hostile environment case, but whether—taken together—the reported incidents make out such a case." Id. Relevant factors within this analysis include "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367; Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir.2000). "`[S]imple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the `terms and conditions of employment.'" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275
The Plaintiff's complaints of harassment by Odom fall into two categories: 1) those related to the performance of his job responsibilities, and 2) those related to being referred to with racially derogatory terms. The Court will first consider those about the performance of his job responsibilities. The Plaintiff has stated a number of ways in which Odom made the performance of his job responsibilities more difficult. Included among those are: failure to involve him as a staff member, disagreement over what time he should report to work, being asked to return his office key without reason, making an inappropriate comment in front of a client, interference with his treatment of clients, instructing other office staff not to speak with him for non-business reasons, refusal to discuss client intakes on two occasions, and being asked to complete Odom's own work. Although Plaintiff's allegations certainly paint the picture of an unpleasant work situation, that alone is not sufficient to make out a Title VII claim. "Title VII does not create a `general civility code' in the workplace; it forbids racially motivated harassment." Arendale, 519 F.3d at 606 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275). The fact that the Plaintiff has alleged that he was harassed by Odom does not prove a prima facie case of a hostile work environment. The Plaintiff must also prove that Odom's harassment was motivated by race.
In his deposition, the Plaintiff stated that aside from being referred to as "whitey" and "white boy," he didn't know whether any of Odom's other conduct towards him was motivated by race. (Depo. of Cooper 32, D.E. No. 26-4.)
(Id.) Plaintiff has also acknowledged that he was warned by the Dyersburg staff that Odom would view him as a threat to take her position because of his qualifications. (Id. at 13.) Without a further showing that Odom's conduct was motivated by race, the Court cannot consider those allegations in finding a prima facie case of hostile work environment. The incidents alleged by Plaintiff are racially neutral on their face. They paint the picture of a personality conflict and disagreement over how the office operated but lack the racial nexus that is required to find an actionable hostile work environment.
The remaining allegations relate to Odom referring to the Plaintiff with racially derogatory terms. In previous cases of hostile work environment based on racially derogatory comments, the Sixth Circuit has stated that a plaintiff may not merely make conclusory assertions as to the frequency of the comments. See Fuelling v. New Vision Med. Labs., LLC, 284 Fed. Appx. 247, 259 (6th Cir.2008). Rather, the plaintiff's allegations must be accompanied "by specific instances of racial comments to support [his] claim that they occurred so frequently as to be severe or pervasive, and give . . . indication of the time, place, or context of the remarks." Id. In Fuelling, the court determined that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of
In the instant case, Cooper alleges that Odom referred to him as "whitey" or "white boy" on every visit to Brownsville. (Depo. of Cooper 19, D.E. No. 26-4.) However, the only instance that Plaintiff points to of Odom using a racial remark is an occasion where she allegedly met him in the office parking lot and told him to "get [his] white ass out of [his] fine car." (Id.) One reported episode of allegedly racially derogatory language is not sufficient to establish that Odom's comments were severe and pervasive. As well, the Plaintiffs assertion that Odom made racial comments every time he visited Brownsville is conclusory and non-specific. Without more, the Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to the severity or pervasiveness of Odom's alleged racially derogatory language. See Fuelling, 284 Fed.Appx. at 259-60 (granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged that she was referred to with derogatory language "on numerous occasions" but was only able to identify the speaker on one occasion); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir.1996) (finding no hostile work environment where only two comments were actually discriminatory); Fasone v. Clinton Twp., No. 97-3267, 1998 WL 165147, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998) (hostile work environment claim failed where plaintiff alleged "constant harassment" but only identified "a few specific discriminatory comments"); see also Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2009) ("[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifics it is difficult to adjudge their severity.").
In summary, the Defendant has made a number of allegations of harassing behavior by Sheila Odom toward him. However, almost all are racially neutral and suggest a general personality conflict between the two and disagreement over how the Brownsville office was run. The Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that Odom's alleged actions were motivated by his race. Further, Cooper's remaining complaint that Odom made racially derogatory comments to him lacks the specificity in time, place, and context to create a general issue of material fact. Thus, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is granted.
Cooper finally argues that the harassment he endured from Odom was so severe and pervasive that it led to his constructive discharge. Although he does not expressly state it, the Plaintiff's contention, which amounts to a claim for constructive discharge based upon a hostile work environment, is one under Title VII recognized by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). To prevail on a constructive discharge allegation based on a hostile work environment, the plaintiff "must show [not only] harassing behavior `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment,'" id. at 133, 124 S.Ct. 2342, but also "that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that [his] resignation qualified as a fitting response." Id. at 134, 124 S.Ct. 2342. "In other words, workplace harassment that is severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment may in some circumstances constructively discharge the employee." Plautz v. Potter, 156 Fed. Appx. 812, 819 (6th Cir.2005).
Because the Court has already held that Cooper has not alleged facts sufficient to prove that he suffered a hostile work environment, it is not necessary to analyze his hostile work environment constructive discharge claim. Cooper's contention is predicated on the same facts as his hostile work environment claim, and the constructive discharge claim likewise fails. See Plautz, 156 Fed.Appx. at 819 ("We have already decided that the complained of actions do not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment, and therefore they necessarily do not rise to the level of compelling a reasonable person to resign."); Campbell v. CCL Custom Mfg., Inc., No. 03-2789B, 2006 WL 222814, at *9 (W.D.Tenn. Jan. 30, 2006) ("Because Plaintiff's claim for hostile work environment, on which his assertion of constructive discharge is based, fails, so too must his claim for constructive discharge."). Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Cooper's constructive discharge claim is granted.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court
